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Abstract—Currently, export control monitoring of the 
proliferation of biological agents in Malaysia falls within the 
ambit of the Strategic Trade Act 2010 (STA 2010), a law drafted 
by Malaysia’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI). At the same time, businesses in Malaysia have not gone 
so far as to initiate an ethical code of conduct to prevent 
biological agents from being proliferated for bioterrorism. 
Beneficence provides the ethical foundation for these relevant 
businesses to prevent bioterrorism. For that reason, this study 
has the objective of exploring best practices that can be turned 
into an ethical code of conduct for commercial culture collection 
businesses in Malaysia, guiding them to prevent biological agents 
from being proliferated for bioterrorism. The methodology for 
this study is qualitative based on primary sources such as 
legislations and international organizational documents as well as 
secondary sources – all of which are collated and examined 
through a content analysis. The results of this study indicate 
lessons learned from the nuclear industry that ought to be 
incorporated in the envisioned ethical code of conduct such as 
sharing illicit request information of biological agents among all 
parties, detection methods, reasons for refusal, personal 
particulars of requesters, and conducting transactions among 
peers that adhere to the non-proliferation of biological agents. 
The Business Ethic Institute of Malaysia (BEIM) and MITI can 
introduce, create awareness of, and draft a model ethical code of 
conduct for the non-proliferation of biological agents to guide 
commercial culture collection businesses in Malaysia. 
Keywords: Strategic Trade Act 2010, bioterrorism, biological 
agent, commercial culture collection businesses, ethical code of 
conduct, Resolution 1540, Biological Toxin and Weapons 
Convention (BTWC) 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
A major event occurred when Malaysia’s export control 
law, the Strategic Trade Act 2010 (STA 2010) [1], a form of 
technology management, came into force in January, 2011 [2: 
20]. An export control law “controls exports of sensitive 
equipment, software and technology as a means to promote 
[…] national security interests and foreign policy objectives” 
[3: 1]. Export controls are implemented to restrict illegal 
technology and weapons, promote regional stability and human 
rights considerations, and prevent the proliferation of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMDs), especially for the purpose of 
international terrorism [3: 1]. Defined as “[m]easures to 
prevent the spread of biological, chemical, and/or nuclear 
weapons and their delivery systems”, non-proliferation is 
synonymous with export controls [4: 3]. While the STA 2010 
has been enforced for five years, much remains unknown about 
its implementation among commercial culture collection 
businesses which may supply and export biological agents, 
whether knowingly or unknowingly, to prohibited countries 
and/or individuals. For the purpose of this study, biological 
agents refer (in section 2 of STA 2010) to any “microbial, 
micro-organisms, virus or infectious substance derived from 
them naturally or artificially, as well as their components” [1]. 
While no terrorist groups have succeeded in utilizing genetic 
engineering for the creation of a biological weapon [5], [6: 
209], both the skills of genetic engineers and easy access to 
biological agents (if successfully utilized by terrorists 
someday) could result in catastrophic bioterrorism. 
Bioterrorism itself is defined as “the deliberate release of 
viruses, bacteria, or other germs (agents) used to cause illness 
or death in people, animals, or plants” [7: 1].  
Parallel to the implementation of STA 2010, commercial 
culture collection businesses should coordinate their own 
efforts by forming a coalition and drafting an ethical  code of 
conduct to prevent prohibited biological agents from being 
used for bioterrorism. Meslin [8: 104] points out that the 
“Statement on Ethical Use of Biotechnology to Promote Public 
Health and National Security and to Fight against 
Bioterrorism” by the Biotechnology Industry Organization 
(BIO) opposes the use of biotechnology for developing 
weapons. Most crucially, Simms [9: 216-217] underlines that 
businesses can contribute to the emerging ethics in 
biotechnology and bioterrorism by practicing business ethics. 
Indeed, Byrne [10: 201] and Quilop [11:70] argue that 
businesses have a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
towards putting an Internal Compliance Program (ICP) in place 
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that is in line with the country’s export control law. In fact, 
Malaysia’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI), which enforces STA 2010, has indicated that a 
company’s ICP may be regarded as a code of conduct [12: 2]. 
According to Malaysia’s Chief Secretary to the Government, 
Dr. Ali Hamsa, STA 2010  is aiding the business, trade and 
commerce community in Malaysia to adhere to high levels of 
ethical standards and that their supply chain also practices the 
same conduct [13: 8]. Likewise, the President of the Malaysian 
International Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MICCI) 
reckons that STA 2010 aligns Malaysia with global standards 
for export controls, enabling businesses to be conducted 
ethically and responsibly [14: 3].   
Against this background, this study has the objective of 
exploring best practices that can be turned into an ethical code 
of conduct for Malaysia’s commercial culture collection 
businesses, guiding them towards preventing biological agents 
from being proliferated for bioterrorism, and thereby 
complementing Malaysia’s STA 2010 implementation. In 
achieving this objective, lessons from the international nuclear 
industry have been referred to.  
This being the case, the following sections address the 
methodology of this study, an overview of the threat posed by 
biological weapons to Malaysia, export controls within the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) [15], 
Resolution 1540 [16] of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), and the ethics of beneficence to prevent harm. 
Subsequently, the results and discussion sections focus on STA 
2010 as well as an ideal ethical code of conduct to be initiated 
by a coalition of commercial culture collection businesses in 
Malaysia after taking into account the lessons learnt from the 
international nuclear sector. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
This is a qualitative study, as most primary and secondary 
sources are examined by means of a content analysis.  
Malaysia’s STA 2010 and MITI’s website have been 
mentioned concerning provisions on monitoring biological 
agents and obtaining information about ICP. An overview of 
the threat posed by biological weapons to Malaysia from its 
Southeast Asian neighbors has relied on internet media and 
newspaper reports, while elaboration of the principle of 
beneficence has been found in secondary sources. For the 
formulation of an ethical code of conduct, secondary sources 
mentioned business initiatives in the international nuclear 
industry that could be followed by Malaysia’s commercial 
culture collection businesses. The BTWC, Resolution 1540, 
and subsequent supporting documents have provided an 
overview of how Malaysia can fulfill its international 
obligations through STA 2010. 
III. THE THREAT POSED BY BIOLOGICAL 
WEAPONS TO MALAYSIA 
A. External Threat 
Within Southeast Asia, terrorists from various countries 
seem intent on acquiring biological agents for the purpose of 
creating biological weapons. An anthrax germ from an 
Indonesian supplier of seed stock was acquired by Al-Qaeda in 
2001 which was subsequently supplied to the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) for US$3,685, shipping costs included 
[17: 2]. In October 2003, a Jemaah Islamiah (JI) manual was 
discovered in Cotabato, Philippines, detailing the intention to 
modify biological agents into biological weapons, thus 
showing the malevolent intentions of terrorists in the 
Philippines [18: 1]. Toxins such as botulinum toxin, nicotine, 
and toxins from poisonous mushrooms and potato buds were 
highlighted in the JI manual [19: 13]. Then in 2010, Abu 
Sayyaf was able to mix a form of biological chemicals into 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that wounded ten soldiers 
in an ambush and landmine explosion in Sumisip, Basilan, in 
southern Philippines [20]. Deadly toxins and bacteria in the 
form of Enterobacter doacae and streptococcus agalacteiae 
were incorporated in landmines used by the New People’s 
Army (NPA) in southern Mindanao in September, 2013 [21].  
Filipino soldiers were injured with evidence of severe 
infections and blackening of the skin of victims [21].  
In October, 2001, Malaysia faced a shocker when the 
United States (US) announced that an anthrax tainted letter 
originating from Malaysia was mailed to the Microsoft 
Licensing Incorporated Office in Reno, Nevada [22:1]. 
However, this was later proved to be a hoax, thereby clearing 
Malaysia’s tarnished reputation [22: 1]. If this anthrax incident 
occurred with Malaysia’s STA 2010 having been implemented, 
it would have been an illegally undeclared export by post. 
Malaysia’s then Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Albar, asserted 
that no terrorist groups in Malaysia had access to biological 
weapons [22: 1]. It is disputed whether terrorist groups have 
access to anthrax besides those within the Malaysian 
authority’s safekeeping within Biosafety Level Three (BSL-3) 
laboratories scattered throughout Malaysia. Avenues exist, 
however, for Malaysian terrorist groups to obtain such 
biological agents as indicated by a subsequent Indonesian 
example.   
In 1998, a few undercover reporters from the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) Sunday Times Insight team approached Bio 
Farma, an Indonesian research institute based in Bandung, that 
offered to sell anthrax, plague, brucella and Escherichia coli (e-
coli) even though the undercover reporters indicated they were 
from a laboratory in Africa [23: 2]. Without double checking to 
ensure these reporters were not disguised terrorists, the 
Indonesian research institute was perfectly willing to supply 
the necessary [23]. This shows that biological agents can be 
supplied by commercial culture collection businesses besides 
government-regulated laboratories. 
Tucker [24: 39] once pointed out that given the many state-
owned and commercial culture collections worldwide which 
exchange and sell microbes and toxins for scientific and 
biomedical research, there certainly needs to be an oversight 
mechanism in various countries to ensure individuals acquiring 
biological agents are trustworthy and that the agents will not 
end up in the wrong hands. Indeed, as highlighted by Atlas [25: 
4], the World Health Organization (WHO) has indicated that 
the world’s culture collections (biological resource centers) 
must never be “mail-order sources for bio threat agents and that 
diagnostic laboratories must not carelessly become a source of 
bio weapons for terrorists”.   
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B. Internal Threat 
Even in Malaysia’s case, its own citizen, Yazid Sufaat, was 
once given the task of cultivating anthrax as a biological 
weapon by al-Qaeda in a laboratory near Kandahar, 
Afghanistan, in 2001 [26: 1]. Since Sufaat’s release from 
imprisonment in 2008, it is not known whether he did try to 
spread his biological weapons’ knowledge to other radical 
Islamic terrorists in Malaysia. Sufaat is now under the custody 
of the Malaysian police once again while his court trial is on-
going for promoting terrorism in Syria [27].  
In Europe, recent concerns were raised that returning 
Islamic State (IS) fighters from Syria could have acquired 
biological weapons knowledge [28: 32]. Malaysia should 
likewise heed this warning as it faces a similar threat from IS 
terrorists returning to Malaysia with bomb-making knowledge 
that endangers Malaysia’s national security [29]. Thus, it is 
quite apparent that Malaysia and its Southeast Asian neighbors 
face the threat of bioterrorism as already discussed. 
This also raises a pertinent concern whether Malaysia’s 
own commercial culture collection businesses could 
unknowingly supply culture media to terrorists if they lack 
awareness about STA 2010. This requires that culture 
collection businesses have access to background information 
about requesters to ensure they are not terrorists trying to use 
biological agents for bioterrorism, and this ought to be 
incorporated into an ethical code of conduct heeded by every 
supplier of biological agents.  
IV. MALAYSIA’S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
A. The Biological and Toxin  Weapons Convention (BTWC) 
and Resolution 1540 
Malaysia’s implementation of STA 2010 fulfills its 
obligation in implementing Article III of the BTWC [15] 
covering export controls. Specifically, Article III of the BTWC 
[15] states that “[e]ach State Party to this Convention 
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly 
or indirectly, and not in any way assist, encourage, or induce 
any state, group of states or international organizations to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, 
weapons, equipment, or means of delivery […]”. While parties 
to BTWC must draft a national law of export control that 
restrains the trade of biological agents to hostile states with 
illicit biological weapons programs, terrorists’ development or 
use of biological weapons is barely addressed within the 
BTWC’s ambit.  
Therefore, terrorists’ acquisition, retainment, production or 
development of biological agents prior to its usage as a 
biological weapon for bioterrorism are not addressed in the 
BTWC, and terrorists would not be prosecuted because no 
international law has made it mandatory for states to 
criminalize these terrorist activities. Nevertheless, subsequent 
soft law documents like Paragraph 7 of the Final Declarations 
of the 6th and 7th Review Conferences of the BTWC [30: 8], 
[31: 9] provide updated and supplementary information besides 
the BTWC text and state “that terrorists must be prevented 
from developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise 
acquiring or retaining, and using under any circumstances, 
biological agents and toxins, equipment, or means of delivery 
agents or toxins, for non-peaceful purposes”. Revill and Dando 
[32: 56] have thus stated that “[w]hile multilateral arms control 
and partial disarmament agreements have a fixed central text to 
work from, they are reconstructed and updated through 
additional understandings which reflect changing concerns 
based on the perception by States Parties of the evolving 
geostrategies context”.  
Passed on 28 April 2004, the UNSC Resolution 1540 [16] 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter requires 
UN members to implement this Resolution in addressing the 
biological weapons threat. In contrast to the BTWC, this 
Resolution stipulates that State Parties must refrain from 
providing any form of assistance to non-state actors like 
terrorists that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, 
possess, transport, transfer, or use biological weapons and their 
means of delivery [16]. Both the BTWC’s subsequent 
document [33: 8] and Resolution 1540 [16] also indicate that 
national laws must also be implemented to prohibit non-state 
actors from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, 
transporting, transferring, or using biological weapons and their 
means of delivery. An additional document [33: 8] to the 
BTWC and Resolution 1540 [16] also emphasizes physical 
protection measures, border control, and increasing 
enforcement efforts through international cooperation to 
prevent illicit trafficking and brokering of such items. A 
supplementary document [33: 8] to the BTWC and Resolution 
1540 [16] also asserts that states and their government 
machinery must also draft a national control list of strategic 
and dual items, as well as the names and contact information of 
individual terrorists, their front companies or their 
organizations responsible for developing biological weapons 
for non-peaceful purposes.  
In 2008, the Committee for Resolution 1540 stressed the 
importance of creating awareness among companies and 
commercial individuals regarding their responsibility to 
implement an effective export control system through outreach 
programs organized by government agencies while companies 
should also implement their own ICP [34: 71]. Encouraging 
companies to implement their own ICP will enable them to 
know their customers better, detect suspicious procurement 
behavior, and notify law enforcement officers of concern [34: 
71]. For Malaysia, an ICP is understood as “a commitment 
taken by the enterprise to voluntarily support the authorities by 
ensuring that internal controls and procedures are in place that 
safeguards the enterprise from being taken advantage by 
proliferators of weapons of mass destruction” [12: 2]. While 
MITI agrees that an ICP within an individual company can also 
be called a code of conduct [12], the ethical code of conduct 
considered in this study is one that will guide a coalition of 
commercial culture collection businesses along the whole 
supply chain to adopt best practices that prevent any illicit 
procurement attempts for the proliferation of biological 
weapons.   
V. BENEFICENCE LINKAGE WITH ETHICS 
The principle of beneficence requires actions on the part of 
individuals to refrain from harming others which is considered 
a negative duty [35: 20], [36: 203]. Beauchamp [37: 20] 
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specifically states that beneficence “[…] requires us to abstain 
from injuring others and to help others further their important 
and legitimate interests, largely by preventing or removing 
possible harms”. Thus, beneficence has one element relevant to 
this study, namely, the injunction not to inflict harm, also 
known as the principle of non-maleficence.   
According to Fisher [35: 20], the principle of beneficence 
“can provide a helpful analytic framework for considering 
ethical issues that arise in business”. Moreover, beneficence 
outlines the duties that businesses have towards their 
stakeholders. Fisher [35: 22] insists that businesses have 
obligations to the community and environment as these are 
aspects that can be harmed by the operations of particular 
businesses.   
Going back to the Biofarma case in Indonesia [23], this 
pharmaceutical company should have thoroughly investigated 
the background of the requesters before ever supplying their 
request. As indicated by Shapcott [36: 203], the duty to prevent 
harm to other fellow beings includes restraining from exporting 
damaging goods and by-products able to cause harm. This 
applies to Biofarma, for it should be cautious in wanting to 
supply and export those biological agents to the undercover 
reporters, especially without thoroughly checking whether they 
could be terrorists. Thus, beneficence serves as a guide for 
commercial culture collection businesses in making an ethical 
decision to refuse to supply biological agents domestically or 
internationally should there be any suspicion concerning the 
requester in order to prevent catastrophic bioterrorism.     
VI. EXPORT CONTROL REGULATION IN MALAYSIA 
A. Overview of STA 2010 
 
This section begins with a brief overview of the scope of 
STA 2010. The preamble of Malaysia’s STA 2010 [1] 
concerns the aim of the law in controlling exports, 
transshipment, transit and brokering of strategic items, 
including arms and related materials, as well as other activities 
that may facilitate the design, development, and production of 
biological weapons and their delivery systems. Biological 
weapon in section 2 of STA 2010 is defined as “any microbial 
or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purpose, and weapons, equipment or means of delivery 
designed to use biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes 
or in armed conflict” [1]. STA 2010 also stipulates the 
justification of biological weapons for prophylactic, protective 
or peaceful purposes like vaccine creation under section 2 even 
though this is prohibited in situations of armed conflict or 
hostility [1].  
STA 2010 describes exports in section 2 as “to take or 
cause to be taken out of Malaysia any items by land, sea or air, 
or to place any items in a conveyance for the purpose of such 
items being taken out of Malaysia” [1]. A group of terrorists in 
Malaysia can easily form a front company and then make a 
request to the commercial culture collection business to export 
biological agents overseas to their counterpart for the hidden 
purpose of creating biological weapons. STA 2010, under 
section 9(1), has stringent requirements for export, 
transshipment and transit of strategic items such as biological 
agents which require a permit [1]. Subsequently, there is a need 
to require an export permit or a special permit as stipulated in 
section 14 (1) of STA 2010 to export strategic items to 
prohibited or restricted end-users which refer to a list of 
individuals, entities, states and destinations that are prohibited 
or restricted under the Strategic Trade (Restricted End-User 
and Prohibited End-Users) Orders 2010 [1], [38]. This is to 
ensure that any entity in Malaysia would not export biological 
agents that may assist in the development of biological 
weapons in other states, thereby tarnishing Malaysia’s 
reputation besides safeguarding its own national security. STA 
2010 (section 8(1)) defines a restricted end-user as an 
individual involved in “any activity that supports the 
development, production, handling, usage, maintenance, 
storage, inventory or proliferation of any WMD and its 
delivery systems” [1].  
B. Code of Conduct for Monitoring Biological Agents 
 
Complementing STA 2010, MITI has made it known to 
businesses in Malaysia involved in the exportation of strategic 
and dual-use items that they should form their own ICP. The 
ICP requires that an enterprise in Malaysia has “procedures in 
place to ensure that thorough investigations of the buyer and 
the end-user had been undertaken prior to shipment and export 
of strategic items and/or technology” [12: 3]. Therefore, 
commercial culture collection businesses in Malaysia will have 
to form their own ICP and ensure that any requester requesting 
biological agents to be exported overseas are not terrorists and 
the end-users based overseas are not affiliated with any terrorist 
organizations that promote bioterrorism. Therefore, it would be 
useful for a coalition of commercial culture collection 
businesses in Malaysia to have their own ethical code of 
conduct for preventing the proliferation of biological agents by 
means of salient features that can be practically implemented.  
Some useful lessons are to be learned from the international 
nuclear industry. For Hund and Seward [39: 42], [40:9], the 
nuclear industry should merely conduct business transactions 
with suppliers that equally adhere to non-proliferation and, if 
needed be, terminate business deals with suppliers of 
proliferation concern along the supply chain. Similarly, 
commercial culture collection businesses in Malaysia should 
agree to conduct business transactions only with businesses 
seeking to prevent the proliferation of biological agents for 
nefarious purposes. Abroad, businesses in the nuclear industry 
have considered non-proliferation as their CSR and thus 
audited fellow businesses to ensure they all comply with non-
proliferation as an ethical code of conduct [40: 9]. This should 
likewise be applicable to Malaysian commercial culture 
collection businesses. There is also a consensus among 
scholars [39: 42], [40: 13], [41:18] that the nuclear industry 
should share best practices for identifying an illicit request, the 
reasons for refusing such a request together with personal 
particulars of the intended recipients (name and country) to 
ensure no company should fulfill such an order. For Malaysia, 
the commercial culture collection businesses should not only 
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share information among themselves but also with MITI 
concerning any illicit request of biological agents, the 
requesters’ name and country, detection methods in identifying 
the illicit request, and the reasons for refusal. Malaysia’s 
commercial culture collection businesses should extend best 
practices of curbing proliferation beyond a country’s 
jurisdiction to make it applicable to subsidiaries, brokers, 
business partners and distributors abroad. In learning from the 
nuclear industry about sharing information, this enables related 
parties to detect the latest entities involved in proliferation and 
the methods to be emulated by Malaysia’s commercial culture 
collection businesses. Another useful lesson drawn from the 
nuclear industry is that failure to share pertinent information 
between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
national regulators, and the nuclear industry has led to new 
nuclear procurement networks, front companies and undetected 
methods of proliferation [41: 6]. Therefore, MITI and the 
commercial culture collection businesses in Malaysia must 
cooperate to prevent the proliferation of biological agents for 
malevolent intentions and to break up newly formed 
procurement networks and front companies.  
MITI, together with commercial culture collection 
businesses in Malaysia, can also record cases of illicit requests 
and refusals and publish export licensing statistics that gauge 
the effectiveness of implementing export controls in the 
country. Therefore, it is crucial that MITI must extend its 
existing outreach activities [42] to the commercial culture 
collection businesses, making them aware that any order of 
biological agents from overseas could be destined for 
bioterrorism and thus ought to be refused.  
MITI should also collaborate with the Business Ethics 
Institute of Malaysia (BEIM) in championing good business 
ethics by introducing non-proliferation as a CSR among the 
commercial culture collection businesses in Malaysia so as to 
prevent the proliferation of biological agents for bioterrorism. 
Since BEIM conducts training workshops on the importance of 
self-regulation [43], the starting point is to stress to BEIM the 
importance of introducing non-proliferation as a CSR in 
Malaysia, since, to the best of our knowledge, this has never 
been carried out. BEIM can certainly assist MITI in drafting an 
ethical code of conduct for businesses in Malaysia to abide by, 
especially concerning non-proliferation initiatives. BEIM can 
also solicit the assistance of foreign companies in Malaysia that 
already implement their own ICP to share best practices with 
local Malaysian Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) unfamiliar 
with the ICP and to instill the ethics of non-proliferation among 
them. Thus, assistance from BEIM can certainly go a long way 
in helping MITI introduce a non-proliferation ethic in Malaysia 
specifically for the non-proliferation of biological agents meant 
for bioterrorism.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
This study begins with the objective of exploring best 
practices that can be turned into an ethical code of conduct for 
commercial culture collection businesses in Malaysia that can 
guide them towards preventing biological agents from being 
proliferated for bioterrorism. Such a code of conduct would 
complement Malaysia’s STA 2010 implementation. The results 
from this study indicate that much can be learned from 
initiatives taken within the international nuclear industry as 
features to be included in Malaysia’s ethical code of conduct. 
These include sharing of information and best practices not 
only within the commercial culture collection industry itself 
but also with MITI concerning detection methods, reasons for 
refusal of an illicit request, and sharing of requesters’ personal 
particulars, thereby assisting MITI to compile statistics 
regarding the effectiveness of export controls. Commercial 
culture collection businesses in Malaysia should conduct 
business transactions among peers that share the same value as 
in preventing the non-proliferation of biological agents while 
shunning businesses that do not subscribe to the same ethic. 
Engaging BEIM to introduce, create awareness of, and draft an 
ethical code of conduct for non-proliferation as a CSR among 
commercial culture collection businesses in Malaysia in 
collaboration with MITI will certainly underscore the 
importance of implementing export control measures.  
While this study used initiatives taken from the nuclear 
industry as a role model, these best practices have been limited 
to that particular industry. Therefore, further studies in gauging 
best practices conducted internationally within the chemical 
industry can contribute to the envisioned ethical code of 
conduct meant for the non-proliferation of biological agents in 
Malaysia. Besides, businesses and policy makers will benefit 
from being able to choose from best practices in both 
international nuclear and chemical industry initiatives. This 
will complement STA 2010 implementation besides promoting 
public–private sector cooperation. 
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